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Ethical Physician Incentives
As health care reform’s focus turns to change in U.S. health 
care delivery, concerns about the 
use of incentives for physicians 
are intensifying. One fear is that 
incentives will undermine physi-
cians’ professional ethos, leading 
them astray from the primacy of 
their duty to patients. Another 
fear is that incentives will be in-
effective and merely cause confu-
sion and irritation among patients 
and clinicians alike, without ac-
tually improving outcomes or ef-
ficiency.1 These fears characterize 
the perspectives of the ethicist 
and the manager, respectively; we 
believe that a synthesis of these 
perspectives is not just possible, 
but strategically valuable for im-
plementing health care reform.
It seems clear to us that in-
centives are omnipresent and un-
avoidable in health care delivery. 
In any context, decisions are in-
fluenced by whatever decision 
makers stand to gain or lose — 
not just in economic terms but 
also in psychological and social 
terms. Accordingly, the debate 
over incentives should focus not 
only on the effect of individual 
elements (e.g., pay-for-performance 
bonuses) but also on the full ar-
ray of financial and nonfinancial 
incentives used by a health care 
delivery system. The challenge for 
the leaders of health care organi-
zations is to shape and align this 
web of incentives in ways that 
promote the institution’s goals 
while avoiding unintended harm-
ful consequences, such as over- 
or underprovision of services.2,3
The importance of this pro-
cess is increasing as financial 
risk begins to be shifted to pro-
vider organizations along with re-
sponsibility for patient outcomes, 
as is currently occurring in ac-
countable care organizations 
(ACOs). For ACOs to be success-
ful, they must improve the effi-
ciency of care. But they must also 
maintain or increase their mar-
ket share, which means that they 
need to fulfill patients’ expecta-
tions regarding experience and 
outcomes. At the same time, to 
attract and retain excellent clini-
cians, ACOs must be places where 
top-quality professionals want to 
work. Incentives, like targets and 
performance measures for quality 
and efficiency, are management 
tools for steering toward these 
goals.
How can incentives be devel-
oped that are both effective and 
ethical? Given the complex reali-
ties of health care and human 
behavior, we believe that a sim-
ple carrot-and-stick model won’t 
do. The economist and sociolo-
gist Max Weber offered a typol-
ogy of motives for social action 
that might be useful in the de-
sign of a more appropriate incen-
tive scheme (see table).4 As We-
ber stressed, these categories 
— which a widely used adapta-
tion has labeled “traditional,” 
“self-interest,” “affective,” and 
“shared purpose” — are ideal 
types, and real-life actions will 
frequently result from mixed mo-
tives. But we believe this typol-
ogy provides a useful framework 
for health care organizations to 
apply in considering their incen-
tive strategies.
Incentive mechanisms that are 
based on these four types of mo-
tives vary in their development as 
well as their ethical implications. 
For example, some provider orga-
nizations were formed explicitly 
to deliver most or all care for a 
well-defined patient population. 
Such organizations may invoke a 
culture emphasizing stewardship 
of resources to motivate clinicians 
to practice efficiently. The incen-
tive for clinicians in this context 
consists in being part of the 
group and its tradition.
Financial incentives typically 
employ the instrumentally ra-
tional mode of self-interest, in 
which individuals and groups 
judge actions by their likely con-
sequences. Examples include fi-
nancial rewards for achieving 
quality- or efficiency-related tar-
gets. These incentives must be 
used with great care, since any 
such incentive, carried to an ex-
treme, has potentially perverse 
consequences. Financial incen-
tives in particular can introduce 
conflicts of interest that threaten 
a trusting patient–physician rela-
tionship; they also provide ready 
targets for external and internal 
critics who are unhappy with 
pressures for change.
Affective motives are frequent-
ly used in nonfinancial incentive 
schemes, such as performance 
rankings that are openly dis-
cussed in group settings, poten-
tially leading to peer pressure. 
These techniques can be highly 
effective and can result in col-
leagues’ learning from one an-
other — for example, when data 
on variation in outcome or utili-
zation of resources causes physi-
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cians to reexamine their care. 
However, peer pressure is a pow-
erful double-edged tool that car-
ries some risk of manipulating 
behavior against individuals’ 
moral judgments. It also requires 
that physicians consider them-
selves part of a community of 
colleagues whose opinions actu-
ally matter to them.
The shared-purpose orientation 
focuses attention on goals that 
are broadly accepted within a 
health care organization. To gain 
such acceptance, these goals must 
resonate with the personnel’s 
sense of purpose. Thus, an or-
ganization’s commitment to the 
triple aim of improved patient out-
comes, better population health, 
and reduced costs cannot con-
flict with, and should indeed be 
shown to align with, the core 
principles of the medical profes-
sion, as expressed in the Physi-
cian Charter on Medical Profes-
sionalism (www.abimfoundation 
.org), including the primacy of 
patient welfare, patient autonomy, 
and social justice. Once a shared-
purpose orientation is accepted 
by clinicians within an organiza-
tion, it can be translated into a 
performance framework through 
incentive interventions, such as 
performance report cards for value-
based care.5
Using incentives both effective-
ly and ethically requires a shift 
away from a simple, one-lever 
model that relies on tradition, 
self-interest, or emotional respons-
es to reward participants for a 
desired action (or punish them 
with financial loss or shame for 
an undesired one). Such an ap-
proach risks alienating physi-
cians and other personnel. Rath-
er, the challenge is to cultivate 
consensus on an organization’s 
shared purpose and put that ori-
entation into action through per-
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formance measurement and use 
of the other types of incentives.
Badly designed incentive 
schemes that do not include the 
dimension of shared purpose can 
be perceived as manipulative, as 
disrespectful of physicians’ pro-
fessional identity, and as state-
ments of power, with economics 
taking precedence over clinical 
concerns. An incentive scheme 
that is based on a robust sense of 
shared purpose, by contrast, pro-
tects and promotes physicians’ 
sense of moral responsibility and 
ethical standards in a way that 
enables physicians to take own-
ership of it rather than feel it is 
imposed on them. Thus, instead 
of being passively graded or re-
warded, physicians engage in the 
development, ongoing evaluation, 
and critical review of the incen-
tive scheme, reporting any nega-
tive effects on the quality, effi-
ciency, and equity of patient care.
We believe that shared-purpose 
orientations are not only a pre-
condition for an ethical use of 
incentives but also essential for 
organizational effectiveness. When 
teams feel ownership of the 
shared goal, they can display 
creativity and flexibility that go 
beyond what’s possible with in-
centives based on tradition, self-
interest, or affective responses 
alone, while maintaining health 
professionals’ sense of moral 
agency and responsibility. Practi-
cally speaking, however, a shared-
purpose orientation alone is fre-
quently not sufficient. Other types 
of incentives must be used to 
enhance organizations’ effective-
ness so that they may pursue the 
shared purpose.
It is not easy to design and 
implement such an array of in-
centives, with each element aimed 
thoughtfully at protecting or im-
proving the institution’s progress 
toward its aims. Again, examin-
ing Weber’s motives of social ac-
tions can help us understand 
what would be suitable frame-
work conditions: an institution 
whose tradition, culture, and mis-
sion health care professionals can 
identify with; a climate of re-
spectful social interactions that 
allows physicians to uphold their 
professional standards and their 
sense of moral responsibility; 
transparency about institutional 
aims and the way they are pro-
moted; a proactive attitude to-
ward monitoring effects of incen-
tives on the quality and fairness 
of patient care and incentive- 
related conflicts of interests per-
ceived by physicians; and pro-
cesses that encourage physicians 
and other stakeholders to engage 
in the development of a shared 
purpose and the continuous eval-
uation and revision of incentive 
schemes.
Under such conditions, incen-
tives — in the sense of financial 
or nonfinancial drivers of action 
— need not be antithetical to a 
morally acceptable practice of 
medicine. In fact, they may prove 
to be valuable instruments in the 
attempt to realize both the eco-
nomic and the ethical visions of 
high-performing health care de-
livery organizations.
Disclosure forms provided by the au-
thors are available with the full text of this 
article at NEJM.org.
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The Oregon ACO Experiment — Bold Design,  
Challenging Execution
Eric C. Stecker, M.D., M.P.H.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation em-
phasize accountable care orga-
nizations (ACOs) as mechanisms 
for achieving cost savings while 
ensuring high-quality care. ACOs 
are expected to contain costs 
through improvements in health 
care delivery and realignment of 
financial incentives, but their 
effectiveness remains unproved, 
and there are reasons for con-
cern that they may fail.1 Oregon 
has embarked on an ambitious 
